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1) Summary 
 
     During the 20th century, advances in biological understanding sparked a global 
revolution in biological capability, or RBC.  Since that time, the revolution has proceeded 
in a Moore's-law-like fashion for many decades.  One negative consequence of the RBC 
is that the US now faces a large and growing threat of catastrophic biological attack.  To 
deal with the threat, this article advocates a two-part strategy. First, during the current 
period of high and growing risk, Period 1, "the Valley of the Shadow of Death", the US 
should bring into being a patchwork of agile technical capabilities to detect and respond 
to attacks, and social and normative policies to diminish their risk of occurrence.  Second 
and simultaneously, the US should initiate research whose fruits will eventually deter 
biological attacks by rendering them "impotent and obsolete". Creation of effective, 
responsive, and agile Period 1 capabilities will buy time, by lowering the probability of 
attacks and blunting their impact, until strong technical defenses enabled by longer-term 
research can become operational in Period 2.  Executing the two components of this 
strategy will be far more costly and complex than is generally contemplated, albeit 
probably less expensive and difficult than execution of the containment strategy during 
the Cold War.  However, the increased security, human health and felicity, and economic 
growth that this activity will engender will repay the effort and cost many times over.  
Entry into Period 2, defense so strong as to deter attack by making it unlikely to have any 
effect, coincides with the effective elimination of most naturally occurring infectious 
diseases as a factor in human affairs.  But at the moment, the best names for Period 2 
seem to be "Partial Victory" or "Basin and Range", in that later trends may shift once 
again to favor attack. 
 
2) The existing strategic landscape and how it came to be 
 
    "Military action, whatever its form, consists in the first place of the study of the 
elements of the problem, and this requires a discipline of mind which excludes fantasy.  
In addition, the means at disposal have fixed properties, respect for which in their case is 
an inflexible condition" (Charles de Gaulle, "Vérs l'armée de métier", 1934) 
 
a) The revolution in biological capability (RBC) 
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     The history of the use of biological weapons in war and of the 20th century germ war 
programs is largely irrelevant to the current strategic situation, and I will not review it 
here.  Rather, I will arbitrarily date the start of the events defining the strategic picture to 
the elucidation of the double helical structure of DNA (Watson and Crick, 1953).  This 
finding immediately suggested how genetic information was stored and transmitted, and 
led within 20 years to an understanding of how it was read out into messenger RNA and 
protein, and to the beginnings of an understanding of how its expression was controlled.   
The ensuing decades of more or less pure "scientific" development, of increasing 
biological knowledge, also eventually sparked a self-propelling increase in biological 
capability.  I refer to this development as the revolution in biological capability, or RBC.  
A good analogy might be how another advance in human knowledge, the understanding 
of electricity and magnetism (codified in Maxwell, 1873) to a threshold theoretical level 
deep enough to use to build technologies, enabled the development of a self-sustaining 
increase in electronic capability.  Examples of the consequences and progress of the 
technologies enabled by theoretical understanding of electromagnetism include long 
range wireless transmissions in the 1900s, deployment of radio onto ships at sea in the 
1910s, mass production of radio receivers in the 1920s, the spread of radio networks and 
the emergence of radio broadcasts as a factor in US and European politics in the 1930s, 
integration of radio and microwave technology into the tactics of air forces, and the 
beginnings of television, in the 1940s, the widespread use of vacuum tubes in digital 
computers in the 1950s, commercial deployment of solid state logic circuitry in the 
1960s... 
 
By this analogy, understanding of the basics of DNA, RNA, and protein molecular 
biology enabled key developments in the RBC including: 
 
• Recombinant DNA methods (Jackson et al. 1972, Carbon et al., 1973),  
• DNA sequencing (Sanger, 1977, Maxam and Gilbert, 1977) and sequencing 
machines (see Hunkapiller et al., 1991),  
• Expression of human proteins encoded by synthetic DNA in bacteria by 
recombinant DNA methods  (Goeddel et al., 1979) 
• Machines to facilitate production of synthetic DNA (see Horvath et al. 1987),  
• PCR, the Polymerase chain reaction (Mullis et al., 1986, Saichi et al., 1988) 
• Determination of the genome sequences of numerous organisms (1980s-present) 
and their distribution via the Internet (1992-present), making it easy for any 
researcher to obtain any stretch of DNA by PCR. 
 
     These examples concern sequencing, isolating, constructing, synthesizing, and 
producing in bacteria defined sequences of DNA, RNA, and protein.  One can lay out 
similar timelines for other protein manipulations, for the ability to introduce DNA into 
cells and organisms and direct the synthesis of new RNAs and proteins, and for the 
ability to produce directed point mutations and directed genomic rearrangements via site 
specific recombination.  Table 1 lists particularly important technical capabilities that 
have grown greatly during the last ten years.   
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     One consequence of the RBC is that information embodied in DNA sequence and the 
actual molecules of DNA, RNA, and protein, are at this point completely fungible.  Every 
day, in thousands of labs worldwide, genes, mRNAs and proteins, isolated from cells or 
organisms, are conveyed as bits (via the internet) or as self replicating molecules (via 
Federal Express), and reintroduced into other cells or used to engineer new organisms.  
Information as to how to perform these manipulations is widely available from cloning 
manuals and the Internet (figure 1). It is thus in biology that one goal of nanotechnology 
(Drexler, 1986), the ability to operate upon strings of bits via "molecular assemblers" to 
produce precisely defined objects, has already been realized.  
 
     The capital costs needed to equip a lab for synthetic and recombinant DNA work are 
low and dropping (figure 2), and there are probably >10,000 labs worldwide that are 
capable of performing manipulations of this type.  Obviously, this synthetic engineering 
capability confined to sequences now found in nature.  Novel DNA sequences are now 
designed and built de novo for introduction into living cells or incorporation into new 
organisms by undergraduate students in technical universities (Ferber, 2004).   
 
     Rob Carlson has attempted to quantify the pace at which some biological capabilities 
are developing (Carlson, 2003, redrawn in figure 3).  In his sketch, some indices of 
capability relating to DNA synthesis, on a semi-log plot, have a steeper slope than the 
Moore's law line showing the increase in the density of semiconductors in integrated 
circuits (Moore, 1975). 
 
b) Impact of the Revolution in Biological Capability 
 
     The extent to which the RBC has already impacted the economy is not widely 
realized.  Here, briefly, the largest 20 pharmaceutical companies (aka "pharma") had 
worldwide sales of >$370B in 2001.  The pharmaceutical industry is now utterly 
dependent on gene cloning, DNA sequencing, protein expression, recombinant 
construction of cell lines, and other recombinant DNA techniques to identify, isolate, and 
"validate" the protein targets against which its small molecule drugs are developed, to 
develop the high throughput assays, and to solve the protein structures that are used to 
identify the chemicals that become the drugs.  It has begun to use these methods to make 
animal model systems to test the putative drugs and to use genomic techniques to select 
and monitor human subjects during clinical trials.  More than half the 2003-2005 top 100 
selling drugs would not exist without these methods.  
 
     Second, molecular biological capabilities have also had an enormous impact on 
agriculture.  By 2003, in the US, more than 1/3 of the corn, 2/3 of the cotton, and 3/4 of 
the soybean crop was genetically engineered.  This decade will see application of 
recombinant DNA methods to animals and plants to produce drugs, and to engineer 
animals with desired traits such as less fatty meat or inability to contract mad cow 
disease.  It may also see the engineering of food crops to meet needs in the developing 
world. 
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     Third, the RBC is directly responsible for the "biotech" industry. Here I use "biotech" 
to refer to two types of firms, those that use recombinant DNA techniques to make 
protein drugs, and those that use molecular biological or genomic techniques to generate 
proprietary capabilities that they sell to pharma.  This industrial sector is sometimes held 
to be disappointing (stock prices are volatile, most investors lose money, an industry with 
$220B total investment had only $220B market cap in 2003, the industry is still 
recovering from a deep recession, etc., etc).  However, for more than 20 years, until the 
2002-2003 downturn, revenues increased steadily at 10-20%/ year, to $38B for 2002.  
And these figures not count the large number of biotech companies that are absorbed 
each year into pharma by acquisition.   
 
    Biotech, the third (and smallest) sector, attracts the majority of the business reporting 
in biology.  The biotech press is relatively unsophisticated about the science, extremely 
vulnerable to spin, and possessed of a notoriously short attention span.  Perhaps because 
of this press focus on biotech, and particularly its focus on "news" defined by events that 
move share prices, the steadily increasing contribution of the RBC to the US economy is 
not widely appreciated and is even sometimes discounted.  As well might Englishmen in 
1845 have complained that economic and social impact of railways had been oversold.   
That is, even though, during the period 1830-1860, most individual investors and most 
railroad companies lost money, the fortunes of individual investors and individual firms 
were utterly irrelevant to a larger economic picture. The capital had to come from 
somewhere, and, in Britain, it came from investors.  By 1845, it was clear that the steady 
growth in miles of track, increase in amount of rolling stock, decreases in cost of 
transport, etc. made possible by these large capital investments were enabling new kinds 
of economic activity and increasing the wealth of the country (Landes, 1969).  
 
     The RBC progresses because its current and likely consequences, including but not 
limited to new medicines, food for the starving, new materials, new industries, and new 
economic growth, are strongly positive.  Numerous, powerful, economic drivers favor a 
continuation of this high rate of change.  In general, every increment in biological 
capability pays back the researcher and the researcher's sponsors in short order. Payback 
comes in the esteem of peers, in promotions, and in increases in the academic or 
corporate salaries of the researchers whose work generates knowledge and new therapies.  
Payback comes in the form of profits for the manufacturers of kits to perform the 
manipulations, royalties for the writers of the methods manuals profits for the drug 
industry.  Payback comes for the public in the form of new drugs and therapies.  
 
     In addition to the fact that strongly established trends suggest that the rate of increase 
in biological capability will remain high, it is important to note that by contrast with other 
kinds of highly technical human activities undergoing progressive change, including for 
example aerospace, semiconductor production, and advances toward hydrogen fusion, the 
RBC is extremely widely distributed.  It advances every day, at tens of thousands of 
research sites scattered throughout the affluent and developing world.  These sites are 
neither controlled nor well-understood by the US government (see for example Boutin, 
2005).  Capital costs are low.  The level of skill needed to carry out the work is typically 
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medium-high and is steadily decreasing, and the ability to perform the work is well-
supported by methods manuals, reagent kits and information available online.  
 
    It thus appears inevitable that, during this century, the impact of the RBC will expand 
from pharma, agriculture, and existing biotech to other economic domains.  Molecular 
biological techniques will transform the synthesis of chemicals, fuels, and materiel (see 
for example the industrial use of directed evolution or "DNA shuffling" methods to 
engineer Trichoderma reesei to allow industrial production, from cellulose, of glucose for 
feedstocks for microbial chemical synthesis, and, from the glucose, ethanol for 
transportation (www.iogen.ca, and Wald, 2005)).  They will be applied to environmental 
remediation (arguably the greatest legacy of the 20th century is cleanup) and 
environmental management (for example, the possible construction of organisms that fix 
carbon more efficiently to mitigate climate change caused by greenhouse gases).  They 
will also impact medical care, enabling monitoring and detection methods that allow 
better preventive care and diagnosis (see below).  By mid century they may well impact 
other activities, such as the construction of buildings, bridges and roads.  In about a 20-
year time frame, many serious observers (Stock, 2002) believe that capabilities that RBC 
has already generated (see figure 8) will be used to engineer humans.  Taken together, It 
thus seems likely that by mid 21st century or earlier, the ability to manipulate DNA will 
be as important to the economy, and to human affairs, as the ability to manipulate 
electrons and bits was to 20th century (Brent, 2000, Carlson, 2005). 
 
c) Unknowable threats and fixed defenses 
 
     "Dynamite makes all men equal, and therefore makes them free".  (Albert Parsons, 
1887) 
 
      "I do not wish to see the coffins of my family, my children, and my grandchildren 
created as a consequence of the utter naivetée, arrogance, and hubris of people who 
cannot see that there is a problem".  (George Poste, 2004) 
 
     At the same time, the RBC has also enabled the current grave and increasing threat of 
biological attack.  Over the next two decades, trends now firmly in place mean that the 
US faces a continually increasing probability of a catastrophic strike, here, arbitrarily 
defined as an attack that kills >3M Americans or leaves them so disabled as to require 
permanent care (figure 4).  The RBC has also greatly increased the number of different 
kinds of attacks that might occur.  In fact, because it is enabled by rapidly developing 
technologies that are practiced by increasingly large numbers of people, it is impossible 
to enumerate the "most probable" or in fact to do more than group then into classes (for 
example, vaccine and antibiotic resistant bacterial pathogens, or viruses with increased 
virulence, resistance to antiviral drugs, and expanded host range )For policy writing that 
begins to grasp this fluid aspect of the biological threat, see Cordesman, 2001).  The 
democratization of technical capability and the increase in the number of people who can 
practice the technologies lengthens the list of actors that might mount such attacks (Table 
2). Together, these developments constitute the most important characteristic of the near-
term biological security environment. 
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     These facts also have an important corollary.  The current defense strategy is to 
enumerate knowable likely pathogens, and to build and stockpile countermeasures 
against each one, The RBC has given to tens of thousands of individuals worldwide the 
knowledge and power to circumvent these countermeasures.  Vaccines and antibiotics 
stockpiled against known or knowable pathogens constitute fixed defenses.  In a century 
when elements from both nature and artifice can be used modify existing organisms and 
to create new ones, fixed defenses can be no more effective for the defense of the US 
than the Maginot line was for the defense of France in 1940. 
    
3) A strategy for defense and partial victory 
 
     "It is a love of comfort, not to say sluggishness, that characterizes those who protest 
against revolutionary innovations that happen to demand fresh efforts in the way of 
intellect, physical striving, and resolution"  (Heinz Guderian, in "Achtung-- Panzer!", 
1937) 
 
     To imagine how to move beyond the existing strategy, it may be helpful to divide the 
first half of the 21st century into two different periods (figure 4).  We are now in Period 
1.  In this period, "the Valley of the Shadow of Death", trends in place increasingly favor 
attack over defense.  The strategic approach during Period 1, particularly its technical 
elements, is essentially reactive, characterized by rapid detection and rapid reaction to 
attacks.  Period 1 can be brought to an end with the implementation of measures that 
provide defense against biological attack so general and so effective as to render attack 
irrelevant, and thus deter it.  In previous versions of this article, I referred to Period 2 as 
"Safe haven" or "Victory", but now refer to it as "Partial Victory" or "Basin and Range" 
(see notes on publication of the 2005 article).   
 
     The remainder of this essay details the technical and institutional steps that the US 
should initiate this decade to minimize the risk during Period 1 and to speed the transition 
to Period 2.  
 
     During Period 1, the set of capabilities that increase the probability of survival 
comprise a patchwork. Some are technical, and require either directed and focused 
engineering efforts or directed and focused scientific research efforts.  Some are social, 
such as the passage of laws and the promulgation of ethical norms.  Taken together, even 
the sum of all the elements in this patchwork is not likely to guarantee the US as much 
security during Period 1 as the US enjoyed during the late Cold War  (1970-1990).   
 
     By contrast, the capabilities needed to bring about Period 2 are largely technical.  
Insofar as one can now envision them, some Period 2 capabilities can only be realized by 
prosecution of a broad array of undirected basic scientific research projects in the context 
of a specific goal-- rendering attack by pathogens ineffective.  The need for undirected 
research that (or, more properly, research that is directed only that it occurs in the context 
of a goal) arises from the fact that one cannot now predict which lines of investigation 
and sets of technical capabilities will be most useful (Table 7 shows examples of the 
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types of capabilities that would be useful), so that, initially, the US will need to confront 
the problem in many ways.  These constraints make it likely that attaining most Period 2 
capabilities will take a good deal of time (~20 years).   
 
     Attaining the operational capabilities needed to survive Period 1 and to bring about 
Period 2 will be difficult and costly but will repay the investment via improved security, 
scientific understanding, human health, and by the creation of entirely new nexuses of 
economic activity.  Moreover, entry into Period 2 will enable the effective elimination of 
naturally occurring infectious disease as a factor in human affairs. 
 
     During both periods, all technical capabilities for defense and partial victory are 
enabled by the RBC.  Attaining them will require input from commercial entities: 
pharmaceutical companies, ag-bio companies, biotech companies, diagnostic companies, 
and from the skilled scientists and executives who work within them.  Existing 
commercial actors will be vital during the formulation of the strategy, and will be utterly 
required for its execution.  However, just as the Air Force needed to take the lead in 
articulating requirements and technical needs to existing aircraft companies and newly 
created aerospace companies when the nation required ICBMs (Hughes, 1998), the 
government must assume that the needed leadership on biological defense cannot come 
from executives associated with the existing commercial sector.  This situation should be 
familiar to policymakers, as it closely matches current challenges in energy policy: if we 
wish to bring about a future in which our economy is less dependent on energy imported 
from abroad, where most of the energy comes from the sun, and our vehicles run on 
hydrogen, the executives and lobbyists for energy companies do not have an existing plan 
to get us there, and do not by themselves possess the expertise to articulate one.  Rather, 
in biology as well as energy, the detailed plan to implement a strategy will come from a 
complex created and orchestrated by the government, while execution of the strategy 
(and of course realization of the profits to be made from executing it), will more likely be 
effected by a combination of existing companies and new ones born in response to the 
national need (see again Hughes, 1998, in particular the second chapter, on the Atlas 
missile program). 
 
4) Strategy for defense against catastrophic attack during Period 1, the "Valley of 
the Shadow of Death" 
 
     "It is therefore by maneuvering that France is protected" (Charles de Gaulle, 1934, 
ibid.) 
 
a) General observations on Period 1  
 
     The first observation on capabilities needed during Period 1 is the current efforts now 
contemplated by the political, medical, and public health establishment (and embodied in 
the US "Bioshield" legislation) consist of procuring and stockpiling assets (diagnostic 
tests, vaccines, antibiotics, and antiviral drugs) against known or knowable threats.  As 
already stated, this approach is tantamount to building a Maginot line.  Although such a 
defensive line may be of some good against technically unsophisticated attackers, a 
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realistic defense needs to assume that motivated nation states, terrorist groups, and even 
individuals will bypass fixed defenses, designing, building, and evolving (see Stemmer, 
1994) pathogenic organisms that resist existing antibiotics, ignore existing vaccines, 
escape detection by existing diagnostic tests, etc.  This fact means that a large fraction of 
the national detection capability, and the bulk of the national response capability, will 
need to be general and agile, able to detect and respond to pathogens whose nature is 
currently unknown and usually will not be knowable until they are used in an attack.  
Because of the need to respond to the unknown, and because an attack will often be able 
to cause considerable damage before an effective reaction can counter it, the totality the 
capabilities the US could marshal during Period 1 cannot provide Americans the level of 
security they enjoyed during 1970-1990. 
 
    The second observation is that the competencies needed for Period 1 defense are now 
greatly fragmented among people in numerous different institutional compartments 
divided by disciplinary, historical, and political distinctions that no longer seem relevant.  
Any attack with a contagious disease will likely be international rather than national or 
regional in impact.  An attack could come on people, or cows, or on the bacteria 
responsible for the ecology of the soil in the US Midwest.  The people who respond to an 
attack might well include military officers, public health officials, biotech executives, 
physicians in clinical practice, physician-researchers, and university professors of 
molecular biology. In each case the more "old-fashioned" skills have not become 
obsolete, but the list of required skills has grown, as has the need for those skills to be 
aligned within a "modern" overarching intellectual and organizational framework that 
overcomes disciplinary boundaries and allows the right people to work together. 
 
     The third observation is that the Period 1 tactical and operational capabilities are 
comprised both of technical capabilities and normative or "social" capabilities.  The 
technical capabilities spring mainly from directed engineering research, and to a lesser 
extent from directed scientific research.  The fact that these technical capabilities can be 
achieved without a great deal of undirected research is good news.  However, with the 
significant exception of the paths pursued by the pharma and biotech industries, biology 
does not at the present have a tradition of directed engineering or scientific research.  It 
has no historical equivalent to the programs that successfully developed the Atlas missile 
or the Internet (Hughes, 1998).  For Period 1 defenses to come on line, US will need to 
create a culture that supports such efforts.  Even achieving the most conceptually simple 
Period 1 technical capabilities (table 4) will be far more costly than most people have 
dared contemplate, and will require overcoming significant institutional and structural 
barriers.  By contrast, attainment of many useful "social" or "normative" capabilities will 
be inexpensive and could happen quickly, and many are proactive rather than reaction.  
However, attaining these social and normative capabilities will require that the US 
persuade other countries to adopt them as well, which in turn will require the US to be 
well-liked and capable of conducting effective diplomatic efforts to achieve its ends 
(table 5).  
 
    The fourth observation is the achievement of these capabilities both requires the RBC 
and feeds it.  Efforts to build Period 1 technical defenses will pay for themselves in new 
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industrial and economic activity and will increase the pace and help channel the 
development of the RBC.  And it is only the continued increase in biological capability 
guided by some measure of government input that can bring Period 1 to an end. 
 
b) Technical elements of Period 1 strategy 
 
    1) Flexible detection  
  
            a) General means to monitor the microbial environment and detect changes and 
emergent organisms within it. 
 
        One component of the strategic problem for Period 1 defense is the need to devise 
systems to achieve near-real-time situational awareness and detection, and patient 
diagnosis and assessment, for known and unknown pathogens.  One small part of this 
problem is the need to get a handle on the microorganisms that are now present in various 
niches in the environment, so that deviations from the baseline can be detected.  
Fortunately, the technology to do this now exists.  At the level of nucleic acids, technical 
means to conduct such surveillance (PCR amplification of random sequences present in a 
sample, followed by characterization of the sequences by hybridization to known 
sequences or even by direct DNA sequencing) have been developed within the past 
decade (see for example Handlesman et al., 2002). Their cost is dropping and their power 
increasing in pure Moore's law fashion.   
 
       Scientifically, the results of such surveys have been breathtaking. Wherever one 
looks, conventional wisdom about microbial ecosystems turns out to have been grossly 
incomplete.  Each ecosystem contains previously unknown microbes and the population 
structure differs from what was thought (Handlesman et al., 2002).  These scientific 
explorations now become relevant to national security.  During this decade, the US will 
need to get a handle on microbial population baselines, in the air: above cities, at ground 
level, in bus stations and airports, in day care centers and office buildings, in water, soil, 
sewers, and feedlots, so it can detect deviations from them (figure 5).  Establishing such 
baselines will pay immediate dividends in new knowledge relevant to health and the 
environment, as well as laying the technical foundation for a surveillance system that can 
detect anomalous events against a background of baselines and trends. 
 
    Technical means for detecting biological attack now deployed or contemplated for 
deployment in the US do not address the above issues.  None give information about 
organisms with RNA genomes (eg influenza virus, SARS virus, HIV, measles virus, 
mumps virus, etc.), none give information about organisms transmitted by coughing at 
ground level (or any route other than attack by releasing an aerosol), none give data about 
the population and deviations from the natural baseline of micorogranisms, and none 
detect organisms that are now unknown.  Perhaps as importantly, the US does not have 
data integration and analytical tools that would permit a national or international 
command to use information from "modern' detectors to recognize outbreaks of existing 
organisms, or new organisms, against the natural baseline. 
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     Since 2003, there have been two significant lines of technical development affecting 
the detection problem.  First, the practice of bulk sequencing of nucleic acids extracted 
from a sample, now usually called "metagenomics" has become widely accepted  (see for 
example Schloss and Handlesman, 2005, and Mongodin et al., 2005).  It is important to 
note that in this context there is no effective difference between a sample coming from 
the environment and one that comes ultimately from other sources such as patient 
isolates, so that any separation of the technology development issues into "environmental 
monitoring" and "patient diagnosis" tracks is not justified by the engineering problems 
that need to be solved. Second, technical improvements in mass spectrometry and 
development of ultrasensitive assays for non-nucleic-acid molecules such as "tadpole" 
based assays (Burbulis et al., 2005, Nolan, 2005), have defined a clear path for future 
technical development of means to survey non-nucleic acid based molecules in a sample 
to tell what organisms are present. 
 
             b) General means to detect and diagnose disease, and to assess disease progress, 
in people and other organisms 
 
     The second arm of the flexible detection network detects organisms and their effects 
in people. As mentioned above, one part of it, the part that detects the organisms, benefits 
from the same technologies that will detect the organisms in the environment.  For 
example, Ghedin et al. (2005) published a study of the sequence of the genomes of 209 
different influenza viruses, which required development of more facile pipelines to 
sequence large stretches of RNA genomes; the same developments that made sequencing 
of RNA genomes even cheaper will benefit environmental monitoring and patient 
diagnosis, whether those RNA genomes were obtained from air samples or clinical 
isolates from throat swabs. Such "genomic" assessments should become cheap enough 
(~$10-$100) so that they are performed routinely during patient visits to physician's 
office and emergency rooms.   
 
    Another component is the accelerated development and deployment of methods that 
rely on "signatures" to provide knowledge of clinical public health baselines, early 
warnings for new disease, and to assess and triage people after an attack. The method 
closest to deployment is the ability to divine information about human disease states by 
monitoring patterns of gene expression (mRNA expression) from a small sample of white 
cells in blood (see figure 6 and Whitney et al., 2003, Rubins et al. 2005, Griffiths et al., 
2005).  At this point there is every reason to believe that deviations of white cell mRNA 
expression patterns from the norm will allow assessment of infection, provide some 
information to help identify the infecting pathogen, and also identify numerous other 
disease states.  Capability to conduct such monitoring, perhaps first deployed to 
determine the clinical baseline for a "sentinel corps" of healthy volunteer individuals, 
should be, as mentioned, be extended to conduct patient assessment and early warning in 
emergency rooms, and for triage of possibly infected people after biological attack.  The 
demand for such broad based assessment will be extremely elastic and would expand 
greatly as the cost was reduced.  Such capabilities would find large markets, and be 
integrated into 21st century schemes for health maintenance and health care delivery.  
Technically (ignoring institutional and commercial barriers), devices allowing 
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establishment of population baseline data could be in use by 2007, and large production 
runs allowing assessment during an infection could be stockpiled and ready for use by 
2007-2008 (Table 3). 
 
    Further from deployment are technical means to monitor proteins and other signature 
molecules in blood and saliva.  However, at this point a number of studies demonstrate 
the diagnostic utility of signature patterns of proteins in blood (see Wulfkuhle et. al., 
2003, and Mor et al. 2005).  In 2003, may of these methods depended on a technique 
called protein mass spectrometry, which was reasonably expensive.  Since that time, 
cheaper wet methods for detecting signatures such ELISAs (Mor et al., 2005) have 
demonstrated their utility and the ultrasensitive methods mentioned above (Burbulis et al. 
2005, and Nolan, 2005) have become available, while, as in most things biological, the 
cost of mass spectrometry has continued dropping at Moore's law rates.  Devices based 
on any of these methods could be deployed well before 2010. 
 
      As these broad based methods become cheaper, their use can be extended to 
economically important animals and plants and, and perhaps eventually to sentinel 
organisms selected by the biological community to monitor ecosystems.  Information 
from these methods, as well as more "classical" epidemeological and public health data 
(eg., the number of visitors to hospital emergency rooms with flulike  symptoms) would 
flow to the same entity that handles data integration and analysis in figure 5. 
 
           c) Agile specific detection of pathogens in the environment and upon infection of 
the host 
 
     In addition to requiring general detection, Period 1 requires technical capabilities that 
enable agile generation of simpler, cheaper tests to detect new pathogens in the 
environment and detect, diagnose, and assess infections by the new pathogens.  In 
diagnosis, development of the polymerase chain reaction (Mullis, 1986, Saiki, 1988) 
opened up new ways to identify and diagnose infectious disease.  PCR based tests for 
specific pathogens are widely deployed and there is an effective national mechanism to 
devise and promulgate new tests.  This is a bright spot, but it is the only aspect of the use 
of molecular methods to diagnose disease in which practice in medicine and public health 
matches the state of the possible.  By contrast to the PCR methods, the technology used 
to detect non-nucleic acid pathogen molecules and the host response to them is 20-30 
years behind the state of the possible.  The reasons for this are complex, but mainly arise 
from institutional barriers mentioned below.  From a technical standpoint, the US could 
field a rapid, agile ability to make specific, very low cost (<$100) non-PCR-based 
diagnostic and assessment assays for pathogens and host responses, based on antibodies 
and other affinity molecules, by 2007-2008. 
 
     2) Agile response 
 
     "Military art finds itself placed in an equivocal position.... to renew the ancient 
processes of maneuver, thanks to all that modern engines possess in the way of power, of 
precision, and of speed, is the task of the tacticians of our day." (de Gaulle, 1934, ibid.) 
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         The key word to describe the needed response capability during Period 1 is that it 
must be agile.   
 
               a) Agile ability to generate new vaccines. 
 
     One component of the Period 1 strategy is to develop means to deploy vaccines 
against new pathogens within weeks of their identification.  Here, it is easy to identify 
components of a directed R&D effort that would allow experimental vaccines to be 
fielded within weeks of identification of a new pathogen. In this view, the US should 
accelerate the development of computational techniques to identify candidate protective 
B cell and T-cell epitopes (with the T-cell epitopes even tailored to match individual 
HLA genotype) on given proteins, and, in complementary experiments, speed the 
development of combinatorial pooling approaches to select epitopes that confer 
protective immunity to mice.  In a first line emergency system, identified epitopes could 
be delivered on synthetic DNA with genes encoding adjuvant cytokines by gene gun, 
while, at the same time, the epitopes would be expressed by recombinant DNA methods 
to make recombinant protein subunit vaccines.  Working merely from a technical 
standpoint (ie, ignoring institutional and regulatory barriers), if work began in 2006, the 
US could deploy a capability to generate [untested] emergency DNA vaccines within a 
week by 2008, and a recombinant capacity to generate [untested] emergency protein 
subunit vaccines within 8 weeks, in 2 years, by 2008. 
 
    The non-emergency testing of vaccines is slowed by the fact that the immune systems 
of mice and humans differ significantly, while human-like primates are scarce, so that 
testing for efficacy depends directly on human experimentation, through that expensive 
and highly regulated medium of the "clinical trial".  Over a 5-7 year time frame, a longer 
term response to these deficiencies would include heavy investments in improved 
functional genomic approaches to understand how and when the generation of immunity 
by vaccines succeeds or fails, in further development of improved computational 
approaches to predict B and T cell epitopes, and in the creation of freely available 
"massively humanized" mice that contain the entire B-cell and T-cell system from 
humans as well as the full complement of human cytokines and cytokine receptors.  
Those capabilities could become available by 2010 or shortly thereafter and significantly 
improve the first order Period 1 emergency DNA and recombinant subunit vaccine 
infrastructure 
 
         b) Agile ability to generate new small molecule drugs. 
 
     For small molecule drugs, there have been continued increases in knowledge of 
protein structure, in the ability to manipulate protein structures and small molecules in 
silico, in combinatorial chemistry and in high throughput directed chemistry. Taken 
together, these advances now make it possible to imagine technical paths that would 
allow identification of reasonably potent small molecules rapidly, perhaps within weeks 
of isolation of a new pathogen and identification of protein targets encoded by the 
pathogen's genome.   Similarly, it may well be possible to establish surrogate markers for 
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side effects that arise during preclinical testing (animal tests) and clinical trials (human 
tests) of these small molecules. Such surrogate markers could provide quick but crude 
information about safety and efficacy.  At this point it seems quite possible that there are 
patterns of gene expression in white cells of mice and people that provide early warnings 
of drug induced toxicity such as kidney damage.  It would be reasonable to imagine that a 
directed research program could result in the ability to go from a new pathogen to 
millions of doses of an experimental small-molecule drug in 6 months by 2012, and in 1 
month by 2020 (table 3).  Periodic monitoring using the technologies developed for 
Period 1 detection would provide real time warning of side effects. 
 
         c) Agile ability to generate new protein drugs, other therapies, and prophylaxes. 
 
    For protein drugs, from this same high-altitude viewpoint, there are essentially no 
technical impediments now to the rapid development of receptor-, ligand-, and antibody- 
type protein drugs. In particular, given an accelerated testing regime, it should be 
possible-- using existing technology-- to field neutralizing humanized soluble 
monoclonal antibody derivatives directed against a new toxin, or that confer passive 
immunity to a new pathogen within weeks of its isolation.  The same ability to isolate and 
rapidly produce new antibodies for an agile specific diagnostic capability could be used 
to generate antibodies for use as experimental drugs and to confer passive immunity 
(figure 7), and it could be available in the same time frame, circa 2008-2009 (table 3). 
 
c) Social and normative elements of Period 1 strategy 
 
     There is a gamut of non-technical steps that the US can undertake during Period 1 to 
increase safety.  As with technical means, non-technical means can supply capabilities 
that can contribute to the overall Period 1 patchwork, even if they are only partly 
effective.  To give examples of steps of this kind, it might be possible for the US to lead 
in creating an international ethical environment where it is expected that biological 
engineers embed hallmarks and signatures in the DNA code they write, and in which the 
design and deliberate release of a biological organism that causes harm is both a criminal 
act and regarded with near universal loathing, on a par with slavery or child molestation 
today.  Even if these cultural controls sometimes fail (as, in the case of terrorist groups, 
they often will), they can help bring about a normative and ethical climate (Kwik et al, 
2003) in which aberrant behavior is more likely to come to the attention of government 
and international agencies that handle intelligence, enforcement, and preemption.  Table 
5 lists a number of possible "social" and "normative" steps that might be of some value in 
this sphere.  By contrast, Table 6 lists other possible tactics that may not be of much use 
for biological defense in the world of the RBC.  Most of these come from the cold war 
era controls on materials and knowledge for nuclear weapons. 
 
d) Barriers to attaining technical and non-technical elements needed for Period 1 
defense 
 
    A full exposition of the barriers to achieving the Period 1 technical capabilities is well 
beyond the scope of this article, but the main ones deserve to be listed.  Many of the 
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technical goals are expensive; attaining them probably will require continued 
expenditures that exceed $10B/ year.  Achieving them will require directed effort now 
scattered throughout numerous disconnected executive branch agencies, mission 
statements, and constituencies.  Achieving them will require learning how to perform 
directed biological engineering and directed scientific research in biology, and how to 
orchestrate the activity of complex combinations of public and private entities.  
Achieving them will require reconfiguring of the current industrial, investment/ capital, 
and intellectual property structure to facilitate creation of an industry that has appropriate 
incentives to combine existing capabilities into working devices and systems and whose 
profit margins and investor expectations are lower than they now are in biology, more in 
line with those now found in aerospace than in pharma (for a taste of how complex the 
creation of a new industrial structure to support needed technical development can be, see 
the description of the Atlas missile program in Hughes, 1998).   
 
     By comparison with these barriers to attaining technical capability, the barriers to 
achieving social/normative capabilities largely consist of configuring US diplomatic 
efforts so that other countries and international organizations will support our objectives.  
Achieving these "social" objectives may be difficult but will be cheap compared to the 
costs of building an adequate national detection network, an agile vaccine development 
capability, and the like. 
 
5) Strategy for entry into Period 2, "Partial Victory" or "Basin and Range" 
 
     Period 2 is defined by capabilities that might allow defense so strong at to constitute 
deter attack, even by individual attackers and terrorist groups.  Most of these capabilities 
have at least one of two characteristics: they are difficult to achieve, or they are radical.  
The last point is probably most important.  Most of the capabilities one can now imagine 
utilize means to eliminate infectious disease as a factor in human affairs, or otherwise 
impact the human condition, in ways that many citizens might find disquieting (table 5). 
 
     In some cases, Period 2 technical capabilities cannot be attained by the guided 
research that characterizes Period 1, but rather will require setting a clear goal and then 
spending money on otherwise-undirected research for decades.  Examples of such goals 
might include the ability to field, in 24 hours, specific combinations of epitopes and 
cytokines that can program the human acquired immune system to create immunity to a 
new pathogen in 24 hours.  They might also include devising combination of protein 
and/or small molecular therapy to create, within 24 hours, a temporary increase in innate 
immunity during a period in which a population was under attack.  These kinds of 
capabilities could well be achievable in a 20-year time frame, but their use would likely 
have severe side effects for some members of a population. 
 
     Other imaginable Period 2 defenses could be achieved by directed engineering and 
directed scientific R&D programs, but many citizens might find them dangerous or 
morally fraught.  Examples include the creation of classes of live infectious gene therapy 
vectors that can be customized in a day to infect specific cell types or the majority of 
cells in the body, in order to deliver tailored protein vaccines, or small inhibitory RNAs 
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(siRNAs or RNAis) to block replication of the pathogen.  Such live infectious gene 
therapy vectors could find "dual use" as weapons platforms.  Another example would be 
to follow up on serious ongoing discussions, and begin to perform genetically 
engineering to extinguish microbial pathogens, and even create species- specific 
deleterious transposons to extinguish naturally occurring animal reservoir species 
(Morton, 2003).  Yet another (and technically simpler) idea is to endow every human 
child, on conception in vitro, with a Human Artificial Chromosome (HuAC) that directs 
the synthesis of RNAis directed against genes specific to the top 25 human viruses, 
arranged so that it is flushed from the germ cells so that the children of resistant children 
can be endowed with an improved version (figure 8).  Such HuACs could have been 
assembled (and tested in cell culture) using 2003 (or 2005) technology in 6-9 months, but 
the political debate that might affect their testing and deployment might span the full 20 
years of Period 1. 
 
     Period 1, "the "Valley of the Shadow of Death", is of course unstable by definition.  
But because of the possible ingenuity of human attackers, there is no reason to assume 
that Period 2, when technical capabilities and trends favor strong defense, will be stable 
either.  For that reason, even "Victory" by entry into Period 2 is likely to be only partial, 
as further trends and technical developments might sometimes shift the balance back to 
give the advantage to ingenious attackers, then as further work by the defenders shift the 
advantage back to favor defense.  These possible shifts give Period 2, "Partial Victory", 
its other name, "Basin and Range" 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
     The US faces the problem of articulating, creating and applying technology and policy 
to provide security in a situation made unsafe by an ongoing revolution in biological 
capability.  This is a complex task.  The US has, however, faced a task of similar 
complexity before, in the middle 20th century, as it sought security in a world that 
contained another superpower armed with nuclear bombs.  In the first decades of the 
Cold War, the US generated technologies, policies and actions that collectively helped 
keep the peace, although the package required creation of entire new institutions (such as 
RAND) and took years (1945-1970) to perfect.  The sooner the country can begin similar 
work in biology, the lower the chance that the US will suffer catastrophic loss of life after 
an attack. 
 
     However, by contrast with the situation for nuclear physics during the Cold War, the 
US needs to configure and execute its security strategy for biology in the middle of an 
ongoing revolution in the technical means to create the threat and to defend against it.  
This revolution is largely of US making.  The country is benefiting greatly from it and 
must depend on its continuing progress to generate technical capabilities required for 
safety.  Although this is a difficult set of starting constraints, there is some historical 
precedent for crafting security policies in such times.  During the late 18th and early 19th 
century, the US successfully started a revolution and channeled its outcomes to 
acceptable ends, while crafting security policy that exploited the revolutionary forces that 
were then loose in the world.   
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     Crafting and executing a sensible strategy will work to the advantage of the US.  
While good policy will increase human happiness and economic growth worldwide, 
many of its first fruits, in terms of better health, and the lion's share of the new economic 
activity, will come to the US.  Moreover, articulating and embracing the proper policies 
will allow the US to exercise the strategic initiative in biology; and the advantages 
accruing to the US from strategic initiative in this sphere should be even greater than 
those that accrue to the US from its ability to exercise strategic initiative in computers 
and the Internet.  To be most effective, the eventual US defense strategy should be 
subsumed into a larger strategy that, among other things, exploits biology to address 
issues of poverty and disease in the less affluent world.  A thoughtful grand strategy for 
biology will help channel the revolution in biological capability to help bring about a 
safer, more democratic, more prosperous world in which Americans can lead good lives. 
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     In general, technical progress between 2003-2005 has been substantial but steady, and 
the most noteworthy technical revisions in this 2005 document reflect developments in 
"proteomics" and molecule detection technologies that could provide promising 
capabilities during Period 1.  By contrast, there has been very little progress in 
implementing defense measures.  In particular, the major point of the 2003 paper, the 
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criticism of the "fixed defense" strategy implicit in the "Bioshield" legislation, still holds, 
and will continue until such time as it is replaced with a defense strategy that better 
reflects the realities of the 21st century world.   
 
     That said, there are two important differences between the analysis in 2003 and this 
apprehension of the strategic situation in 2005.  The first is that, even though fixed 
defenses are Maginot lines, some effort on Maginot lines seems unavoidable.  Just as, in a 
democratic France during the 1930s it would have been imprudent and politically 
impossible not to fortify the border with Nazi Germany, in the US in the 2000s, it is not 
politically possible not to stockpile defenses against pathogens such as unmodified 
smallpox and anthrax.  The point is that policymakers now must consider when to halt 
construction of further fixed defenses and begin to build agile ones.  I am grateful to 
Stephen Johnston and Ben Petro for making this point convincingly.  The second is that, 
given the likely ingenuity of possible human attackers, success at bringing about strategic 
Period 2 ("Partial Victory") may not result in a lasting stable period.  Should Period 2 
begin, it is possible that the balance of technical trends may shift yet again to favor 
attack, and then perhaps shift yet again favor defense.  Although I had realized that 
Period 2 would not necessarily be stable, I had not faced up to the necessity of 
articulating that as part of a proposed strategy.  I thus am grateful to a number of people, 
including Drew Endy and Stephen Johnston, for making the point, and to David Relman 
for proposing the term "Basin and Range" to describe this likely landscape.  If Period 2 
does have an end, it likely lies in significant transformation of the human species by 
means including biological engineering.  This is an important topic, but it lies beyond the 
scope of this article.   
 
     Finally, I dedicate this 2005 paper to Andrew Marshall, whose life's work has 
demonstrated consistently how useful good strategy can be. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1.   Some key technical capabilities enabling the RBC that have developed 
significantly over the past two decades. 
 
 
 
DNA sequencing 
 
Oligonucleotide synthesis 
 
Chemical synthesis of long stretches of double stranded DNA 
 
Improved ability to make very large DNA constructs by recombination 
in vitro and by serial recombination in vivo 
 
Improved ability to introduce DNA constructs into cells and organisms 
and control gene expression from them 
 
Diversity-generation-selection techniques, including combinatorial 
affinity reagent approaches and "DNA shuffling" 
 
Control of cellular phenotypes such as differentiation state, induced 
immortalization 
 
Derivation of adult animals and plants from cells engineered in vitro 
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Table 2. Strategic periods 1 and 2.  See also figure 4. 
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Table 3. Stratification of possible attackers.  Table guesses level of threat given 
continuation of current trends, including current efforts to build countermeasures 
assuming Period 1 type measures not undertaken.  Threat level diminishes if realistic 
countermeasures are implemented. 
 
 
Types of 
Attackers 
(2005) 
Types of  
Possible 
Attackers 
(2015-
2025) 
Level of 
Threat in  
2005 
Level of 
Threat in 
2015 
Level of 
Threat in 
2025 
Nation 
States 
Nation 
States 
Low Lower Still 
(relatively) 
Can’t Call 
Sub and 
Trans-
national 
Groups 
Sub and 
Trans-
national 
Groups 
High Very High Very High 
 Disaffected 
Individuals 
and Garage 
Hackers 
Low Medium Very High 
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Table 4.  Possible Period 1 technical capabilities.  Table shows possible capabilities, 
including fixed defenses, general detection capabilities, and agile response capabilities, 
the types of attackers against which they might be effective, and a guess at the time 
needed to achieve them if the US started trying to develop them in 2005-2006. 
 
Possible 
protection 
conferred by 
existing (2005) 
or newly 
initiated 
measures 
Nation States Sub and 
trans-national 
groups 
Disaffected 
individuals 
and garage 
hackers 
Time to 
OP/TAC 
capability if 
US initiated 
sensible 
actions soon 
Deterrence and civil 
defense via 
stockpiles of drugs 
and vaccines 
against predictable 
threats or threats 
discoverable by 
intelligence 
+/- +/- - 
Could do some 
deterring of clueless 
terrorists and 
disaffected 
individuals now, but 
gets easier to 
engineer around so 
spent by 2010 
Deterrence and civil 
defense via 
improved ability to 
detect and respond 
to an attack 
+/- +/- - 
 
Boxes below show 
time to attain 
different 
components 
• Establishing 
baselines and 
broad-purposed 
detection systems in 
people 
   2009 for systems 
using 1990’s tech 
• Establishing 
baselines and 
broad-purposed 
detection systems 
for plants and 
animals 
   2009 for systems 
using 1990’s tech 
• Establishing 
baselines and 
broad-purposed 
detection systems in 
environment 
   2009 for systems 
using 1990’s tech 
• Agile ability to 
generate specific 
diagnostics 
   Exists for nucleic 
acids, 2008 for other 
markers 
• Agile ability to 
generate vaccines 
   2006-2007 for DNA 
vaccines, 2010 for 
protein 
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• Agile ability to 
generate small 
molecule drugs 
   2025 
• Agile ability to 
generate human 
antibody and other 
prophylaxes 
   2009 
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Table 5. Period 1 social capabilities.  Table shows non-technical protective capabilities 
that might be helpful during Period 1, attackers against which such measures might offer 
protection, and time it might take to achieve them if the US began seeking them in 2005-
2006. 
 
Possible 
protection 
conferred 
by existing 
(2005) or 
sensible 
future 
operational 
and tactical 
capabilities 
Nation 
States 
Sub and 
trans-
national 
Groups 
Disaffected 
individuals 
and garage 
hackers 
Time to 
OP/TAC 
capability if 
we initiated 
sensible 
actions 
soon 
Deterrence 
via 
international 
treaties and 
criminal law 
+ - + 
Exists now. 
2007, for 
improved 
regime 
Deterrence 
via threat of 
military 
counterattack 
+ - - Exists now 
Disruption via 
counter-
intelligence 
and counter-
terrorism 
activities 
+/- +/- - 
Exists now? 
Must make 
way better 
Surveillance 
of threatening 
activity using 
watchlists for 
equipment 
and reagents 
- + + 
2005-2006, 
May be of 
some utility 
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Surveillance, 
disruption and 
deterrence by 
stings, 
honeypots, 
and other 
spooky tactics 
- + + 
2005-2006, 
May be of 
some utility, in 
at least taking 
the pulse of 
the world 
 
Table 6.  Other imaginable protective capabilities.  These are taken from Cold War 
period controls on nuclear materials and knowledge.  Table illustrates that these may not 
be useful during Period 1 and Period 2.  
 
Protection 
conferred by 
other 
imaginable 
future 
operational & 
tactical 
capabilities 
Nation States Sub and 
trans-
national 
groups 
Disaffected 
individuals 
and garage 
hackers 
Reasons not a 
great idea 
Control of 
biological 
material, strains, 
viruses, etc. 
- +/- +/- 
Almost irrelevant 
already. Irrelevant for 
all classes of 
attackers by 2010-
2015 
Control of 
microbiological 
equipment + - - 
Large production 
runs, weaponization, 
irrelevant for 
contagious diseases 
used by terrorist 
groups and by 
individuals 
Control of key 
reagents - +/- +/- 
Would require 
worldwide enabling 
legislation, and 
worldwide 
enforcement 
Synthetic DNA 
Internet 
surveillance, 
“Total Sequence 
Awareness" 
- +/- +/- 
Will be perceived as 
evil, and will be 
circumvented 
Control of 
knowledge of 
weaponization 
+/- +/- - 
Nation States will 
learn anyway, 
concept is irrelevant 
for contagious 
diseases spread by 
some terrorists or 
Kaczynski-types 
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Control 
knowledge of 
construction 
techniques - - - 
Cat unstoppably out 
of bag, too much 
positive economic 
payback and power 
from ongoing 
revolution 
Control 
knowledge about 
disease 
mechanisms - - - 
Unprecedented 
global censorship 
regime throws babies 
including future 
progress in defense 
out with the 
bathwater 
 
In the valley of the shadow of death.  v3 draft for NAS committee   1 November, 2005            page 29 
 
Table 7.  Possible technical capabilities characteristic of Period 2, "Partial Victory".  
These are examples only, as it impossible to be definitive as to what technical capabilities 
might be achievable in 20 years time. 
 
 
Combination of antigen presentation schemes and cytokines allows 
rapid (~24 hour) programming of human acquired immunity against 
new pathogens. 
 
Cocktail of cytokines and/or other small molecule drugs allows rapid 
(~24h) hyperactivation of human innate immunity. 
 
Ability to rapidly deploy tailored transmissible genetic elements 
(transposons) to extinguish animal reservoir and vector species. 
 
24 hour ability to make and release live broad host range self 
replicating gene therapy vectors that rapidly spread through 
population to counteract new pathogen. 
 
Endowing humans at conception with Human Artificial Chromosome 
(HuACs) that makes siRNAs that confer immunity to top 20-50 human 
viruses. 
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Figure 1.  Popular "how to clone" it manuals.  Current Protocols in Molecular Biology 
is continually updated by subscription (1987-2005).  It has about 10,000 subscribers 
worldwide.  Molecular Cloning (first edition 1982) has sold almost 200,000 copies in 
various editions. The book at bottom is an authorized short version of CPMB in Japan.  
Pirated English editions of CPMB in China and Japan have been widely available for 
purchase for at least 15 years.  
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Figure 2a. DNA synthesis in an everyday lab.  Work area for an ABI 394 DNA/RNA 
synthesizer.  Post-it note shows scale; the entire machine takes up three feet of space on a 
lab bench.  The synthetic DNA is made in the four columns in the upper left.  The 394 
can synthesize ~1000 bases of DNA per 24 hours.  Tens of thousands of such machines 
are in daily use worldwide.  New and used synthesizers are commonly sold on E-bay and 
other Internet market sites; in 2005, the market price of the used machine shown here 
would be about $12,000.  Many labs do not synthesize their DNA but instead order it 
from one of many hundreds of small, transitory commercial suppliers in the US and in 
other countries.  Photograph from MSI, Berkeley, California, 2003. 
 
Figure 2b.  Large scale DNA synthesis in a company dedicated to this task.  The 
technician operates a commodity PC that controls a multiplex parallel DNA synthesizer 
built from off the shelf commercial components.  Note the relatively modest footprint of 
even the large setup. Photograph courtesy Glen Evans, CEO, Egea Biosciences, La Jolla, 
California, 2003. 
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Figure 3.  Increasing capability for DNA synthesis.   Figure shows the "Carlson curve" 
for DNA synthesis and is redrawn from Carlson (2003). In this semi-log plot, the Y axis 
shows the number of DNA bases that a single person with appropriate equipment can 
synthesize in a single (24 hour) day.  Y axis may overstate true numbers, in that DNA 
needs to be assembled into larger pieces and the sequence verified, but it makes the point 
that the trend is up and that capability is growing steadily, in fact, apparently 
exponentially. One can make similar curves for DNA sequencing (Carlson, 2003) and for 
the ability to assemble large DNA constructions such as complex plasmids and artificial 
chromosomes. 
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Figure 4.  Risk of catastrophic biological attack on the US as a function of time.  
Here, I arbitrarily define "catastrophic" attack to mean >3M dead or so disabled as to 
require permanent care, and arbitrarily denote scale on the Y axis from "lower" to 
"higher".  Figure shows three trend lines.  A shows the "valley of the shadow of death", is 
the risk if current trends continue, even if "fixed defense" stockpiles of drugs and 
vaccines are built.  B shows the risk if Period 1 general detection, agile response, and 
social capabilities become operational.  C shows the trendline if strong Period 2 technical 
defenses can come on line.   Dashed component of the C line indicates that technical 
trends could shift again to favor attack, and again to favor defense, which gives the 
period the name "basin and range". 
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Figure 5. A system to provide situational awareness of the microbial genomic 
environment.  This is a Period 1 technical capability for general detection.  Construction 
of such a system would now be an engineering endeavor rather than a scientific one; the 
technology to build it continues to improve rapidly but all of its components have existed 
since the middle 1990s.  New components can be inserted into the system and old ones 
replaced by newer ones as different monitoring methods become cost effective. 
Improvements in detection of proteins and other arbitrarily designated molecules should 
allow integration of the ability to detect and inventory non-nucleic acid molecules into 
the detection system by later this decade.  A system that included these components 
would provide near real time information about the normal composition of the microbial 
environment and alert public health and defense authorities to deviations from it and the 
to appearance of new organisms.  Diagram makes the point that the needed capability is 
not a set of deployed devices, but rather a system of systems much like the overlapping 
radar, satellite and other detection mechanisms that comprise the detection component of 
the North American air defense network.  In the US, a few components of such a system, 
shown on the upper left, are in place: such as very limited monitoring of city air for a few 
known pathogen species.  However, available public data suggests that most detection 
components, including the ability to gain general sequence information, and, in 
particular, the ability to assay RNA genomes, from the environment and from patient 
samples such as throat swabs, are not.  Moreover, the US does not now possess other 
needed parts of this system, including proper analytical and software tools to visualize 
and exploit this data, and a national or international entity can integrate this data to 
generate a near-real-time assessment of the current microbial situation.  Because an 
attack or emergent disease could begin anywhere in the world, detection components 
(sensing nodes) for a detection network would eventually need to be globally deployed. 
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Figure 6.  Detection, diagnosis, and assessment of infections by surveying signatures 
of gene expression in white cells.  Another Period 1 general detection capability.  In this 
case the capability enables diagnosis and assessment of known diseases and new diseases 
in people.  PBMCs (Peripheral blood mononucleocytes, here simply called white cells) 
circulate freely in the blood and so encounter most of the kinds of cells in the body.  They 
respond to conditions they encounter, for example contact with inflamed tissue or 
infection, by changing the pattern of genes they express.  Genes (in white cells as in all 
cells) are transcribed into messenger RNA (mRNA).  In response to a new condition such 
as infection, some of the genes make less mRNA (down arrows), some make more (up 
arrows).  The pattern of deviations from this baseline constitutes a signature of disease 
states.  Some deviations from the normal state, shown in blue, may be common to all 
infections, while others, show in here in purple, may allow discrimination among 
diseases caused by different pathogens, and specific assessment of disease states.  
Information flowing from routine monitoring of sentinel individuals and from patients 
during outbreaks should flow to the same data integration and assessment entity shown in 
figure 5.  The technology to collect these signatures dates from the 1990s.  Leaving aside 
(for the moment) intellectual property and regulatory considerations, it is entirely 
reasonable to imagine that devices that enable such assessments could be manufactured 
for contract prices of $100 per unit in production runs of 1-10M units.  Government 
action to create such large production runs could, as happened in the semiconductor 
industry, create a climate of continually increasing performance and reduction in cost, 
and jump-start an industry whose products will enable greatly improved point of care 
medical diagnosis and routine (for example, annual) monitoring for health maintenance. 
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Figure 7.  Industrial recombinant production of human antibodies in mammalian 
cells.   An example Period 1 agile defense capability.  Photograph shows plumbing and 
access through tops of two 12,500 liter reaction vessels ("bioreactors") in a production 
suite at a California biotechnology company; the bodies of the vessels extend downward 
by another 2 stories.  Commercially, human antibodies are now used a therapeutics for 
human diseases such as cancer, but antibodies produced in such facilities could also be 
used for human disease prophylaxis, to confer temporary (six week), "passive" immunity 
to new pathogens. A kilogram of neutralizing antibody should be able to confer passive 
immunity to a million people.  Current production levels for recombinant antibodies are 
well above 1mg/ml in two weeks, even using the "transient transfection" methods that 
would allow newly-cloned antibody genes to be put into industrial production most 
rapidly.  A plant built around this production suite could produce more than 25 kg of 
antibody every two weeks, or more than 50 million doses of protective antibody from the 
first month's production run.  There is at present considerable worldwide overcapacity in 
GMP-certified commercial plant that can produce antibodies (Thiel, 2004).  Even when 
that overcapacity has disappeared, the capital costs of a purpose-built, dedicated reserve 
facility that could normally be used for civilian purposes but that could be diverted to 
defense production in time of need would be significantly less than that of a single F-22 
aircraft.  
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Figure 8.  An nontransmissable HuAC that confers resistance to 25 human viruses.   This 
is an example of a technical capability that might be characteristic of Period 2 ("Partial 
Victory"), in which defense is so effective as to deter attack.  Figure shows a Human 
Artificial Chromosome (HuAC) to be introduced into fertilized human egg on conception 
in vitro.  Testis- and ovary-specific expression of a site specific recombination protein 
(Cre) deletes centromere (Cen) and origin of replication Ori), so will not be transmitted 
into sperm and eggs, allowing parents who carry this construction to introduce new 
HuACs that confer desired traits into their own children.  Chromosome contains 
constitutive promoters that direct the synthesis of an set (here, 100) different small 
inhibitory RNAs (RNAis or siRNAs).  These 100 RNAis block the expression of 4 genes 
encoded by each of 25 chosen human viruses.  This design uses only 2000-2005 
technology; artificial chromosomes have been used in other mammalian species in 
research and agriculture for more than a decade.  In 2005, it would take less than 12 
months for a small research group to make this construction and verify its ability to 
confer resistance to viruses in cell culture.  It would then take some additional years to 
test it in mice and primates.  This kind of approach exemplifies a Period 2 capability that 
requires engineering work and testing, but not basic research, and so in principle could be 
achieved quickly, but it shares with other Period 2 technical capabilities the characteristic 
that it seems radical, and, because its deployment seems to offer significant changes in 
the human condition, might in practice not be attainable in much less than 20 years. 
  
In the valley of the shadow of death.  v3 draft for NAS committee   1 November, 2005            page 42 
Technical publication information 
 
In the valley of the shadow of death 
v3 to 2005 NAS committee 
Copyright 2005 and 2006 by Roger Brent 
Draft 
To be Published 21 November 2005 
CC deed Atribution-NoDerivs 2.5 
Fair use permitted 
Some rights reservedDOI not yet assigned. 
 
 
